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I am grateful to Anand Vaidya for his thoughtful and enthusiastic review. In the spirit 
of constructive engagement, I reply to Vaidya's comments on my book, Dialogues on 
Relativism, Absolutism, and Beyond: Four Days in India (“RAB” for short). Vaidya's 
review continues the dialogical spirit of RAB by introducing a fifth fictional 
interlocutor, Manjula, to comment upon RAB's four fictional interlocutors. When I 
started to think about my own comments I was tempted to introduce a sixth, even a 
seventh interlocutor. But I concluded that would be unwieldy. So I have decided to 
come out from behind RAB’s four characters and comment in my own voice on 
Manjula's comments about them. Given space limitations I will comment on some 
selected points, arranged in an order different from Vaidya’s.  
 Since the publication of RAB, its sequel has appeared. Its title is Oneness and the 
Displacement of Self: Dialogues on Self-Realization (“ODS” for short). The four 
interlocutors in RAB continue their conversations in ODS. While the main themes of 
RAB concern relativism versus absolutism, ODS concentrates on Nina’s Advaita 
view which is “beyond” relativism and absolutism. Readers of RAB may wish to 
consult ODS for a ramified discussion of Nina's views. Here then are my comments 
about Manjula's interventions.    
Defining Relativism. I begin with Ronnie's definition of relativism. “Relativism 
claims that truth, goodness, or beauty is relative to a reference frame, and no absolute, 
overarching standards to adjudicate between competing references frames exist.” 
(RAB, 10) Ronnie's definition allows that relativism may range over “truth, goodness 
or beauty”--not “truth, goodness and beauty.” One reason for the “or” rather than the 
“and” is that it allows for either piecemeal or global treatments of relativism. Manjula 
capitalizes on the possibility of treating relativism in different ways in different 
domains.  
 In reference to RAB, 34, Manjula says that, “...relativism is initially attractive in ________________________ 
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certain areas of discourse, or what we might call domains.” Following a piecemeal 
strategy, she distributes relativism according to domains. That strategy accords with 
Ronnie's definition of relativism. Yet there is an impediment in doing so. How should 
we characterize the pertinent domains and the joints that are supposed to separate 
them? Are their descriptions supposed to capture a frame-independent fact of the 
matter?  Or are their descriptions meant to capture constructed cultural achievements? 
The construal of pertinent domains and their joints implicates relativist or absolutist 
predilections. Question-begging looms. 
 Similarly, in regard to RAB, 52, Manjula observes, “it is easier to be a relativist 
in the case of morality and aesthetics than it is in the case of logic and mathematics.” 
Quite so. Yet, such ease gets burdened when interlocutors raise questions about the 
nature of the domains in question. Indeed moral realists will object to characterizing 
morality in relativist terms. And mathematical, logical or scientific constructivists 
will object to characterizing mathematics, logic, or science in absolutist terms. (See 
Catherine Elgin, in Krausz, 2010a). The domains in question are themselves variously 
construed as regard their relativist or absolutist standing. 
 Ronnie’s definition of relativism captures a wide range of established usages. 
Alternative definitions may emphasize a supposed incommensurability between 
reference frames (See Richard Bernstein 1983, 8).  Other definitions may emphasize 
multivalent rather than bi-valent truth-like values. (See Joseph Margolis 1976) 
Manjula provides an ample and useful discussion of multivalence. In regard to RAB, 
44-45, one might wonder why Barbara raises the issue of multivalence in the first 
place. The reason is that bivalence is central to a version of relativism that diverges 
from, but is nonetheless compatible with, Ronnie's starting definition. Barbara does 
so as a point of contrast with Ronnie’s definition. Focusing upon cultural phenomena, 
Margolis notes that interpreters of cultural phenomena characteristically invoke 
multivalent values—such as reasonableness, appropriateness, aptness, fittingness and 
their opposites—in contrast to the bivalent value of truth and its opposite. 
Accordingly, Margolis urges that opposing judgments that would be contradictory on 
a bivalent logic turn out not to be so on a multivalent logic. Opposing judgments on a 
multivalent logic would be incongruent rather than contradictory. To say that a 
Marxist interpretation of Vincent Van Gogh's “Potato Eaters” is reasonable, for 
example, is not to say that a Christian interpretation of the same painting is 
unreasonable.  
Self-Refutation of Relativism. In regard to RAB, 63-64, Ronnie rehearses the well-
worn self-referential argument against relativism, namely “The assertion that 
relativism is absolutely true is self-contradictory.” Notice that Ronnie partly defines 
relativism in terms of the negation of absolutism. If we disentangle absolutism into 
three strands—namely realism, universalism or foundationalism—does the self-
refuting argument against relativism still apply? On RAB, 65, Nina affirms that the 
charge of self-contradiction dissolves when absolutism is disentangled in this way. 
On RAB, 80, as Nina distinguishes between the three strands, she shows that their 
various combinations amount to harder or softer versions of absolutism. 
Consequently their relativist opposites amount to harder or softer relativisms. 
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Manjula seems to agree with all of this. Yet she goes further.  She inquires whether 
the disentangled strands are compatible with each other. Of course, the hardest 
version of absolutism combines realism, universalism, and foundationalism. It may be 
instantiated by a moral realist, for example, who holds that moral facts exist 
independently of reference frames, that they apply to all human beings, and that they 
reflect values that reveal inherent features of what it is to be a human being. The 
plausibility of such a hard version of absolutism is another matter, beyond the scope 
of RAB. 
Meta-Principles. In regard to RAB, 63, Manjula raises the question, “Is it possible 
for one to be a relativist about truth...and to limit the scope of application of the 
principles in question?” Can one say that the claim of relativism is a meta-principle 
that is outside the scope to which it applies? The point of doing so would allow one to 
say that, “All statements are relatively true except for the statement that says that all 
statements are relatively true.” This strategy seems arbitrary or ad hoc, invoked 
merely to avoid the self-referential argument. The reason why it seems to be so arises 
from an often assumed, perhaps unmentioned, meta-meta-principle, namely, “It is 
best to keep ‘meta’ principles consonant with object-level principles, unless there are 
good non-arbitrary reasons to make a particular object-principle an exception.” Such 
good reasons would need to overcome the fact that meta-principles might be infinitely 
generated. That is, a given meta-principle may become an object-principle with 
regard to a higher order meta-principle. Such a process can be generated infinitely. At 
some point, though, in order to save one from the charge of self-contradiction, one 
will have to stipulate that a given meta-principle is not relative. Where that point does 
come promises to be arbitrary. (See Paul Boghossian, in Krausz 2010a.) 
Foundationalism. Manjula observes that Nina is right to say (RAB, 76) that “The 
foundationalist says that there is an ultimate [or foundational] constituent. The non-
foundationalist says that there is no such thing as an ultimate constituent.” Manjula 
suggests a third possibility, namely, “that there are ultimate and there are no ultimate 
constituents.” But does her third possibility reduce to one of the first two? Here is the 
analogy Manjula adduces to make her point. “The analogy would be the example of 
light, which has a fundamental dual nature particle and wave. It is both a particle and 
wave, and given that particles are not waves, it is like saying that something is both F 
and not-F. This dual nature is fundamental to it. Likewise, we could say that reality 
has a fundamental dual nature: to have an ultimate constituent and to not have a 
fundamental constituent.” I presume that Manjula takes “ultimate” or “fundamental” 
to be synonymous with “foundational.” Now, it is one thing to say that light has the 
dual nature of both particles and waves, and another thing to say that that duality is 
foundational. Either that dual nature is taken to be foundational or it is not. Indeed, 
some physicists hold out the possibility that the apparent incompatibility between 
particle and wave will be overcome by the eventual discovery of a unifying wave-
particle or “wavicle.” Yet whether the discovery of a wavicle is foundational is a 
separate and an open question. Affirming the dual or singular nature of light in itself 
commits us neither to foundationalism nor non-foundationalism. 
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A “Third” Attempt at Reconciliation. In reference to RAB, 36, Barbara seeks to 
reconcile relativism with absolutism. She attempts to do so by combining the term 
“relativism” with “absolutism” in order to generate “absolute relativism” or “relative 
absolutism.” Then she asks herself what ramified self-consistent view each of these 
compound phrases might generate. 
Manjula proposes what she thinks is a further view that might reconcile relativism 
with absolutism. She calls it perspectivism. But is perspectivism a third view, one that 
is reducible to neither “absolute relativism” nor “relative absolutism?” Manjula asks, 
“Why can’t it be that relativism is one perspective on the way things are, and 
absolutism is another perspective on the way things are?” (RAB, 36) That question 
invites us to consider relativism as one reference frame and absolutism as another 
reference frame. It effectively invites us to relativize absolutism. But relativizing 
absolutism results in “absolute relativism,” one of the possibilities that the 
interlocutors have already considered. 
  Reasons. Barbara says (RAB, 88): “Without aiming to convince another person to 
embrace their view, relativists might seek to share their rationale for embracing their 
view.” In so doing relativists might offer what I have elsewhere called ampliative 
reasons in contrast to determinative reasons. (See Krausz 2007, 36-37) Ampliative 
reasons seek to promote an understanding as to why persons embrace the view that 
they do. Determinative reasons aim to demonstrate the superiority of one view over 
another. As such they aim to convince an opponent of the rightness of their view. In 
contrast, Manjula offers a different distinction. She says: “We have to distinguish 
between hardened debate and positioned-inquiry.” Hardened debaters “are not open 
minded...[while] in positioned-inquiry each participant has a point of view, but is 
open-minded.”  To tell the difference we should ask, “Are they open-minded, curious, 
creative, courageous, and patient in their examination of the evidence and in their 
intellectual engagement? Or are they close-minded, blunt, cowardly, and negligent in 
their examination of the evidence and in their intellectual engagement?” The 
distinction between ampliative reasons and determinative reasons is not coextensive 
with the distinction between positioned-inquiry and hardened debate. When offering 
ampliative reasons one can be an open-minded fallibilist or a closed-minded 
dogmatist. And when offering determinative reasons one can also be an open-minded 
fallibilist or a closed-minded dogmatist. Accordingly, debaters about relativism 
versus absolutism can offer their reasons in either an ampliative or a determinative or 
way. Neither way makes them fallibilists or dogmatists. 
 Fallibilism. In regard to RAB, 12, Manjula expresses doubts about global 
fallibilism. She concedes that while one might be fallibilist with respect to some 
domains—say, beliefs about the future or the external world—one should not be 
fallibilist about self-verifying claims. She suggests that “I am here now” is immune 
from doubt. Of course, “I am here now” can be left unquestioned. But in principle it 
too is fallible. If we take seriously the Advaita view as embraced by Nina, for 
example, we can legitimately ask, “Is it I that is here?” “Where is here?” and “When 
is now?” Depending upon one’s answer to such questions, one could be wrong to say, 
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“I am here now.” The exemption of such self-verifying claims from global fallibilism 
is contentious.  
Frames of Reference and Facts of the Matter.  In response to Adam's sort of 
realism Manjula says (RAB, 22): “To talk of a reference frame or a plurality of 
reference frames is to talk of a frame of reference relative to something that is not a 
frame of reference. You might as well call these matters of fact.”  Manjula is too 
casual when she says, “You might as well call these matters of fact.” For “facts of the 
matter”—as all the interlocutors use that phrase—designates frame-independence. So 
we should not force upon Ronnie “facts” in a realist sense. For Ronnie, facts exist, but 
they do so, ineliminably, within reference frames. (See Nelson Goodman, in Krausz 
2010a.) Manjula does get the point right though when she says further, “Frames of 
reference are frames onto something. But on the other hand, this just seems to be an 
artifact of the way the language we use forces us into thinking there is something 
there. Why can’t it just be frames upon frames upon frames all the way down?” 
Manjula comes to see that it is a mistake just to assume that there must be some 
frame-independent thing that reference frames are of, that is, some stuff out there that 
they reflect. Here Manjula agrees with Ronnie. 
In regard to RAB, 39, Manjula repeats Barbara’s insight: “There’s no fact of the 
matter whether the shortest distance between two points is a straight line independent 
of a given geometry. The shortest distance between two points is a straight line in 
Euclidean geometry and it isn’t so in a non-Euclidean geometry.” Manjula continues, 
“However, once I tell you that in fact we live in a curved space, there is a fact of the 
matter about what is the shortest distance between two points.” Once we distinguish 
between facts that are internal to reference frames and those that are external to 
reference frames, there is no disagreement. Both of these women agree that internal to 
Euclidean geometry it is a fact that the shortest distance between two points is a 
straight line, and it is not a fact in a Riemannian geometry. Yet Manjula presses the 
point that both of these geometries are still "about" something in common, namely 
space. As Manjula puts it, “there must be something in common between all 
geometric systems, for example that they are systems used to describe space. Can’t 
we say that the thing in common is in fact the real absolute across all of these 
things?” Here Manjula commits the mistake she just warned us against. Commonality 
of what reference frames might be about does not entail a realist construal of what is 
common. Accordingly, getting things “right” need not be construed in realist terms.  
Frames of Reference as Negative Filters. In regard to RAB, 47, Manjula says, “It 
seems like we always think that because something may not capture everything, that 
it distorts or falsifies or doesn’t allow us to get at things in some important way. But 
this comes about by imposing a negative meta-frame on the words lens, language, 
and filter.” By “getting at things” Manjula presumably means, “getting closer to the 
truth.” Yet again question beggingness looms. Relativist Ronnie can concede that 
lenses and the rest can help us get closer to the truth. But he need not unpack “getting 
closer to the truth” in a realist way. One who embraces a coherentist rather than a 
correspondist theory of truth can agree that lenses, language and filters can advance 
certain purposes and interests, but still disallow that we “get at things.” To put the 
25 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 5.1 (2014)  KRAUSZ 
point in pragmatist terms, Barbara, for example, might urge that what is good for us 
to believe need not pretend to reflect the way a presumed world is. Lenses and the 
rest need not be taken to distort if nothing can be said about what is beyond them. The 
idea of “distortion” does not require a realist construal.   
Sameness. Nina observes (RAB, 18) that, for reference frames to compete—rather 
than talk past each other—they would have to be talking about the same thing. 
Strangely, Manjula objects. She suggests, “it might just be false that a necessary 
condition on two frames competing is that they are talking about the same thing.” Yet 
sameness is a necessary condition. What is at issue is not whether sameness is a 
necessary condition for competition between reference frames.  Rather, what is at 
issue is the sense of sameness that is necessary. Manjula herself confirms this point 
when she suggests that it is enough if competing reference frames address roughly the 
same thing. Indeed, both Adam and Ronnie can agree that competing reference 
frames need address roughly the same thing. 
Knowledge of the World and Polymorphism. In regard to RAB, 40, Manjula 
questions whether the result of frame-dependent interpretations can constitute 
“knowledge.” Unless we place a realist construal on “knowledge,” no knowledge of 
“the world” would be possible. Ronnie could reply that, for the idea of “world,” we 
had best substitute the idea of “world-version.” He could go on to affirm a view that I 
have called “polymorphism.” (See Krausz 2010b, 25.) Polymorphism holds that no 
given level of description can be presumed to be ultimate or foundational. For 
example, if we describe the water in the glass before us as thirst quenching, we might 
take that description to reflect a truth about “the world.” Yet notice that thirst 
quenchingness is a property of water that applies at a certain level of description. As a 
middle-sized phenomenon, water affords certain satisfactions to middles sized 
organisms. Yet when we redescribe what is before us in terms of electrons in empty 
space, the property of thirst-quenchingness does not apply. Polymorphism holds that 
what is taken to be a property of “the world” must be understood elliptically, that is, 
with an understanding of a certain level of description, or within a reference frame. 
Now apply the same polymorphic insight to Manjula's example. Manjula may 
truthfully know that she is hungry. Yet that knowledge depends upon her 
understanding herself as a middle-sized organism rather than as a collection of 
electrons in empty space. Were Manjula to understand herself as a collection of 
electron in empty space, the claim about her hunger would be inapplicable. 
Interestingly, this polymorphic view is shared with Tibetan Buddhists who hold that 
nothing exists inherently. That does not mean that nothing exists. It means that 
whatever does exist does so conventionally. One consequence of this Buddhist view 
is that the human self in empty of inherent existence.  
Oneness and Adjudication.  In contrast to the Tibetan Buddhist, Nina embraces 
the Advaita notion that ultimate reality is the inherent, undifferentiated, ineffable 
Atman or the One. She observes (RAB, 25) that the One could do no adjudicatory 
work, including adjudicating between reference frames. Even if we had access to it—
perhaps via certain meditative practices—it could still do no adjudicatory work. After 
all, how could the One distinguish and adjudicate between metaphysical reference 
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frames when it is undifferentiated and ineffable? The One is beyond adjudication. 
This would be so despite the fact that the One is “understood” at the so-called 
“absolute” level of existence. Of course, what “absolute” means for Nina is quite 
different from what it does for Adam and Ronnie, namely frame-independence.  Nina 
takes the absolute One to transcend both absolutism and relativism. Adam's 
absolutism pertains to individuated phenomena, and the One is not that. The One is 
no absolute adjudicator. So, with Nina, one could embrace the One and still allow 
relativism as Ronnie defines it. 
Anxiety About Death. In regard to RAB, 91, Nina says, “We all seek freedom 
from suffering of old age and death. We all seek freedom from the anxieties 
associated with our mortality.” Manjula objects to Nina’s universalist presumption 
that all persons suffer death anxiety and seek freedom from it. It would be wrong for 
Nina to assert, even to legislate, such a universality. The claim that all human beings 
suffer from death anxiety is too strong. Yet, it would be fair to say that human beings 
characteristically suffer a measure of anxiety associated with their mortality. The 
question how widespread that anxiety is is empirical. On this point I defer to the 
empirical work of psychotherapist Irvin Yalom in his perceptive book, Staring at the 
Sun. (See Irvin Yalom 2009.)  
Limits of Language. In regard to RAB, 116, Barbara rehearses Nina’s view that 
“the debate between Adam and Ronnie dissolves because language can’t capture the 
way things are. You [Nina] think that language is inherently limited because of its 
essentially dualistic nature. So, since both Adam's and Ronnie’s arguments–inevitably 
in a language–seek to capture how things are, they both must fail to do so.”  In turn, 
Manjula questions whether all languages, including formal languages, have to be 
dualistic. I agree with Manjula that the possibility of non-dualistic languages—natural 
or artificial—remains open. In addition, for purposes of human expression there 
seems no reason why language, natural or artificial, should not suffice. Yet Nina 
could well have added that any duality, not just those in languages, can be drawn only 
at the relative level.  She would insist that language could not capture the One, which 
is without limits. Yet saying that, even if dualistic language is incapable of capturing 
the ultimate way reality is, seems to presuppose that in some way we know how 
reality is in order to affirm that language is incapable of capturing it. (See Bimal 
Matilal 2001)  
A Category Mistake and the Displacement of Self. In regard to RAB, 97, Nina 
considers the question, “What is the relation of Oneness–the realm of no relations–to 
the realm of differentiated, countable individuals [including individual reference 
frames] and their relations?” She rejects the question since it does not recognize that 
the One could have no relations to start with. Nina says: “In the realm of no relations, 
there’s no question of the relation between it and the realm of relations. Your 
[Barbara's] very question disallows the realm of no relations.” Manjula also rejects 
the question, but her reason for doing so differs from Nina’s. Manjula suggests that it 
commits a “category mistake” rather like the question, “Does 2 have parents in 
Mumbai?” I agree with Manjula that such a question, while grammatically correct, 
commits a category mistake. Keeping in mind the mantric refrain, “Thou Art That,” 
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“Thou”—understood as an individuated person—is just not the sort of being that 
could qualify as being “That”--understood as the absolute One that Nina seeks to 
realize. But something deeper than a category mistake is going on here. It concerns 
Nina's project of self-realization. That project is encapsulated in the mantric refrain 
that Nina adopts. Its ritual repetition is meant to aid in altering one's consciousness. 
As “relative” individuals we may ask, “What is the relation between me, my 
individual personal self, and the One?” Yet, insofar as the One admits of no 
individuality, the question no longer arises. Ritual repetition of the mantric refrain is 
meant to displace the personal speaker as the subject, then to be replaced by the 
impersonal space of the One.	   (See	   Krausz	   2013,	   section	   6.)	   Whatever	   else	   one	  might	   want	   to	   say	   about	   Nina's	   conception	   of	   self-­‐realization,	   noting	   that	   its	  mantric	   refrain	   exhibits	   a	   grammatical	   category	   mistake	   does	   not	   so	   easily	  dismiss	  it.	  
I look forward to further exchanges with Anand Vaidya about relativism, 
absolutism and beyond. For me, this engagement has been most constructive. 
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